May / June 2003

May 1st – Cold War Victory Day
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On the Cover: An exhibit from the Iron Curtain Museum "SCHIFFLERSGRUND in Germany. Photo courtesy of Werner Juretzo – Cold War Museum European Affairs Coordinator.

About the Cold War Museum
Founded in 1996 by Francis Gary Powers, Jr. and John C. Welch, the Cold War Museum is dedicated to preserving Cold War history and honoring Cold War Veterans.
For more information: Cold War Museum, P.O. Box 178, Fairfax, VA 22030 Ph: 703-273-2381
Dear Friends of the Cold war Museum,

The last several months have been very hectic. I am pleased to report that our proposal to locate at the Lorton Nike Missile Base in Fairfax County Virginia was submitted to Fairfax County Park Authority earlier this year and that we gave an oral presentation to the Park Authority on April 28. Our proposal is currently under review and we are waiting to hear a final determination in the near future.

On May 1, 2003 I visited with the Cold War Museum Midwest Chapter in Milwaukee, Wisconsin and gave a presentation at the Milwaukee Press Club on our activities to create the Midwest Chapter of the Cold War Museum in a suburb of Milwaukee on the site of a former Nike Missile Radar installation. In addition, we and helped to promote the Cold War Veteran Association’s Cold War Victory Day during our May 1 presentation.

After visiting Milwaukee I drove to Oshkosh, WI to give a presentation at the opening weekend for the EAA Museum. While at the EAA Museum, I packed up the mobile exhibit on the U-2 Incident, which is now in route to Las Vegas, Nevada for a one year display and will be formally unveiled on October 3, 2003 at the National Test Site Museum.

In March 2003, we were notified that Virginia legislation was passed for the creation of a Cold War Veteran's license plate. As soon as we generate 350 pre-paid orders from Virginian Cold War Veterans we will start to receive $15 from the sale of every plate. If you would like to help implement Cold War Veteran license plates in your home state, please email me at gpowersjr@coldwar.org.

Because we are so close to locating in Lorton, Virginia, now is the time that we need your continued financial support. Please consider making a donation to the Cold War Museum's general fund. Your gift will help us plan for the physical location. Tax-deductible contributions and artifact donations to the Museum will ensure that future generations will remember Cold War events and personalities that forever altered our understanding of national security, international relations, and personal sacrifice for one's country. Please help spread the word about the Museum. Together we can make this vision a reality.

Francis Gary Powers, Jr.
Wisconsin, Kansas Governors Proclaim
May 1st as Cold War Victory Day
Bryan J. Dickerson, CWT Editor

Few organizations have been working harder on preserving the memory of the Cold War and recognizing those who fought in it than the Cold War Veterans Association. Just recently, members of CWVA worked with the Governors of Kansas and Wisconsin to have May 1st proclaimed as “Cold War Victory Day.” In his proclamation, Wisconsin Governor Jim Doyle characterized the Cold War as a struggle for freedom “against the tyranny and brutality of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.” Kansas Governor Kathleen Sebelius expressed similar sentiments to her Wisconsin counterpart and honored the Kansas Cold War veterans. Members of the CWVA joined Governor Sebelius on 29 April when she issued the proclamation. (See photo above courtesy of CWVA Chairman Vince Millum.)

In related news, the CWVA was honored by the Kansas House of Representatives with a Commendation issued on 28 March 2003 for their work in recognizing Kansans who served in the Cold War.
Congressman Moore Calls For National, State Observances of Cold War Victory Day

Bryan J. Dickerson, CWT Editor

Washington, D.C.: In remarks in the House of Representatives, Congressman Dennis Moore (D-Kansas) called for national and state governments to observe the 1st of May as “Cold War Victory Day,” and called upon President George W. Bush to create the Cold War Victory Medal by Executive Order.

“May 1 was the traditional day of celebration for Communists worldwide, and displays of military might,” said Congressman Moore. “It is fitting that May 1 now become a day of celebration of liberty for free peoples everywhere, and for remembrance of the sacrifices that made the downfall of Communism a reality.”

Also in his remarks, Congressman Moore cited numerous Cold War events that occurred in May, including the 1 May 1960 shootdown of Francis Gary Powers’s U-2 plane over the Soviet Union, the 1949 end of the Berlin Airlift, and the loss of the nuclear attack submarine USS Scorpion in 1968.

In paying homage to Cold War veterans, Congressman Moore stated “we refuse to allow their bravery to go unheralded in the name of ‘political correctness.’” He also saluted the freedom fighters who rose up against Communist oppression in Eastern Europe at various times during the Cold War.

Congressman Moore represents Kansas’s 3rd District. He is also a Cold War veteran, having served in the U.S. Army and Army Reserves and is a member of the Cold War Veterans Association.
Cold War Museum Honors Former Radio Broadcaster, KGB Abductee

On behalf of Francis Gary Powers, Jr., President of the Cold War Museum, CWM European Affairs Coordinator Werner I. Juretzko present-ed the Cold War Pin to Richard Baier last month at the Iron Curtain Museum “Schifflersgrund” in Germany. Baier is a former radio broadcaster for the RIAS- Berlin (Radio in the American Sector). In 1955 he was kidnapped by the Soviet KGB and the East German secret police known as the ‘STASI.’ He was sentenced to 13 years in prison for “spreading anti communist propaganda.” Baier serves as the CWM liaison in Germany. (Photo courtesy of Werner Juretzko).

Visit the CWVA online at www.coldwarveterans.com
U.S. Senate Ratifies NATO Expansion
Bryan J. Dickerson, CWT Editor

Washington, D.C.: The U.S. Senate voted 96-0 on 8 May 2003 to approve the addition of seven Eastern European nations to NATO. In a post-vote ceremony, President George W. Bush was joined by the foreign ministers of the seven aspiring NATO nations and Congressional leaders in celebrating the historic vote.

“This year on VE Day we mark another kind of victory in Europe,” said President Bush. “These heroic nations have survived tyranny, they have won their liberty and earned their place among free nations. America has always considered them friends, and we will always be proud to call them allies.”

During the Cold War, these seven nations were all dominated by the Soviet Union. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania had been forcibly annexed by the Soviet Union during World War II. Bulgaria and Romania were members of the Warsaw Pact. Slovenia was a part of the now defunct Yugoslavia. The Slovak Republic was a part of Czecho-slovakia. Each nation now is independent and democratic.

With the Senate vote, the United States became the 3rd NATO nation to ratify the expansion. The remaining 16 NATO nations must approve the expansion before the new members are admitted. President Bush urged them to do so as soon as possible.

NATO expansion enjoys widespread public support in the prospective new members. A March 2003 public referendum held in Slovenia found over 66% public approval for that country joining NATO. An April 2003 poll commissioned by the Lithuanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs reported that over 75% of Lithuanians supported their country’s effort to join NATO.

The seven prospective members of NATO were originally part of the Vilnius 10, a group of ten Eastern European nations seeking acceptance in NATO. The other three nations - Albania, Croatia and Macedonia - have not yet met NATO’s requirements for admittance.

“The defeat of Nazi Germany brought an end to the armed conflict in Europe,” said President Bush. “But that victory did not bring true peace and unity to the continent. For millions, tyranny remained in a different uniform. The freedom of Bulgaria and Romania and Slovakia and Slovenia was subverted by community dictators. And Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were wiped off the map as independent countries.”
How the Left Has Distorted the Cold War
Bill Craig, CWT Contributing Editor

The infatuation with Communism and the “blame America” attitude of some academics, writers and others on the political Left is explored to devastating effect by syndicated columnist Mona Charen in her new book *Useful Idiots: How Liberals Got It Wrong in the Cold War and Still Blame America First*.

“Who won the Cold War?” Ms. Charen asks in the introductory chapter. “It seems absurd to pose the question, and yet, the past decade has become so clouded by revisionism and retroactive self-justification that a measure of clarity on the matter has been lost.

“Some on the Left are now attempting to obscure the history of the period—to say that all of us were united in our opposition to Communism. That is false...

“The West won the Cold War. The free nations defeated the totalitarian ones. The capitalists outperformed the statists. The believers outlasted the atheists. The United States of America, flawed and divided as we were, persevered to see the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and nearly all of its satellites implode. For most Americans this was a welcome and even prayed-for conclusion to the Cold War. But for many others, it was neither hoped for nor celebrated.”

The author reviews the history of the Soviet Union from “when the Bolsheviks hijacked the Russian Revolution in 1917,” and describes the early fascination and sympathy for Communism by the some prominent figures in the West, especially during the Depression years. The title of the book refers to a remark attributed to Lenin describing them. Because of the Soviets’ actions at the end of World War II, there was a wide domestic consensus during the 1950s that the U.S. should contain the Soviet Union. Then it began to unravel, particularly during the Vietnam War. In the following years some liberals came to regard Communism as generally a beneficial force, and blamed America as a gross, blind, and blundering giant. Professors “poisoned the
campuses with anti-Americanism and anti-capitalism,” and entertainers “used the megaphones of their fame to blame America first.” They built up a mythology about “McCarthyism” and regarded the Cold War, instead of a struggle between liberty and tyranny, as “a foolish confrontation caused by groundless suspicion and paranoia on both sides.”

Ms. Charen reviews major international events up to the present, when after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks “some precincts on the Left... can find reasons to blame the United States for the hatred directed against it...”

The 308-page book, which has been on The New York Times bestseller list for several weeks, was published by Regnery Publishing, Inc., Washington, D.C.

CARIBBEAN CRISIS – DIAGNOSIS OF DECEPTION
James Hansen / 7 May 2001

[Editor’s Note: This is the third and final installment of a three-part article written by James Hansen on the Cuban Missile Crisis. The article originally appeared in Studies in Intelligence. A full copy of the article may be found at http://www.cia.gov/csi/studies/vol46no1/index.html]

The SIGINT Aspect

Much has been told about Uncle Sam’s “eyes” during the crisis, but very little about his “ears.” Material declassified and released in 1998 reveals that signals intelligence (SIGINT) played an important role. SIGINT did not provide any direct information about the nuclear missiles in Cuba, but once they were discovered, SIGINT provided direct support for day-to-day management of the crisis.¹

¹ National Security Agency, NSA and the Cuban Missile Crisis (Fort Meade, MD: NSA Center for Cryptologic History, 1998), p. 1. This is one of the newest sources of information concerning US intelligence.
NSA played an important role in penetrating some of the maskirovka. As the ships poured forth their cargos, the Soviets and Cubans took extra precautions to keep them secret. They kept gawkers away from the wharves, unloaded at night, and moved the nuclear cargoes away under black canvas and escorted by heavy guard. The US Government knew this from NSA intercepts of chatty Cubans discussing the procedures.\textsuperscript{2} SIGINT also revealed that Soviet vessels were making false port declarations and declaring less than the known cargo-carrying capacity of their ships. By late August, NSA noted that there already had been 57 voyages to Cuba in a little over a month and also that some ships were on their second voyage in that period of time.\textsuperscript{3}

At the height of the crisis, SIGINT operators listened to the radio messages to and from Soviet ships on their way to Cuba. A US Navy direction finding net in the Atlantic located the Soviet ships by intercepting and triangulating messages that they were sending, and determined that they had stopped dead in the water, outside the ring of US ships waiting for them.\textsuperscript{4} Once Moscow agreed to remove the ballistic missiles from Cuba, NSA reports provided evidence that the USSR considered the crisis to be over.

\textbf{The HUMINT Aspect}

A major campaign to use Soviet as well as Cuban HUMINT channels supported the overall deception effort. The campaign primarily consisted of funneling pieces of information regarding the actual presence of missiles through counter-revolutionary organizations and their press in the US, and especially in Miami. This campaign presupposed -- correctly -- that the CIA would discount this information, because it would not consider the groups and people peddling the information to be credible. As such, the planners leaked accurate

\textsuperscript{2} NSA, \textit{ibid.}, pp. 2-3. The US SIGINT ship Oxford was hugging the Cuban coastline at that time.

\textsuperscript{3} NSA, \textit{ibid.}, pp. 3-4.

\textsuperscript{4} NSA, \textit{ibid.}, p. 10.
information about the deployment so as to mask it. This strategy was highly effective, according to information published by a former Cuban intelligence officer in 1998.\(^5\)

The deception campaign designed to exploit the émigrés’ lack of credibility was backstopped by correspondence between Cubans and their friends and relatives in the U.S. From June to September, Cuban intelligence intercepted some 17,000 letters that had something to say about the deployment of missiles in Cuba. The topic of Soviet military men in Cuba was of great interest to average Cubans, many of whom could not resist telling a friend or family member, and this was reflected in the many letters intercepted. In late September, Cuban authorities permitted those letters to arrive in Miami, as part of the deception campaign. Just as Havana expected, the CIA paid no attention to these letters.\(^6\)

For US intelligence analysts, the amount of “noise” from Cuba grew deafening. Reports were flooding in from Cubans themselves, from tourists, from newspaper officials reporting in a private capacity, and from foreign diplomats in Cuba. At the CIA focal point at Opa-Locka, Florida, CIA officers screened countless reports and debriefed Cubans who had fled the island.\(^7\) Most of the reports from Cuba were exaggerated or imaginary, and some were so outrageous that they were laughable and made all the others suspect. There were far-fetched tales of African troops with rings in their noses, lurking Mongolians, and even Chinese troops. These accounts followed earlier erroneous reports of Soviet military equipment secreted away in caves, underground hangers, and concrete domes. This type of misinformation cast doubt on the dependability of sources making the reports, so US analysts found it easy to dismiss this stream of reports of Soviet missiles.\(^8\)

By early October, Cuban intelligence became baffled and amazed by the failure of American intelligence agencies, the Defense Department, or most members of Congress to acknowledge or respond to the Soviet nuclear deployment. They figured that either the CIA

\(^{5}\) Domingo Amuchastegui, “Cuban Intelligence and the October Crisis,” *Intelligence and National Security*, Volume 13, Number 3, Autumn 1998, p. 101. This is a special issue on intelligence and the crisis, edited by James G. Blight and David A. Welch. It is a unique, extraordinary collection of articles on the role of different intelligence services at that time.


\(^{7}\) Detzer, *op. cit.*, p. 59.

\(^{8}\) Detzer, *op. cit.*, p. 60.
was truly ignorant of the forces and missiles in Cuba or that it was aware and withholding its knowledge of the deployment for some reason. The very best HUMINT came from Colonel Oleg Penkovsky, who passed on valuable information on the SS-4 and SS-5 missiles. On 19 October, the CIA prepared a detailed memorandum on the SS-4 missile sites in Cuba that relied heavily on the information provided by Penkovsky. While the identification of the missile sites was based on imagery, changes in the status of the sites could be ascertained only by referring to the extensive details in the classified documents Penkovsky supplied. The SS-4 manual he supplied helped the CIA determine for the President how long it would take to complete the SS-4 installations and to fuel the missiles. Richard Helms, who later served as DCI in 1967-1973, claims that the assessment "gave President Kennedy three extra days." His information also included the range, accuracy, refire rate, and other vital information about the SS-4 missiles.

Conclusions and Key Findings

US intelligence never saw nor comprehended some key things. Looking at the crisis in retrospect, one is drawn to US shortcomings in three major areas: (a) the issue of tactical nuclear weapons in Cuba; (b) the overall Soviet troop strength there; and (c) why it took so long to discover the surface-to-surface missiles in the first place.

According to General William Y. Smith (USAF, ret.), who served on the staff of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Maxwell Taylor, every day the military asked, "Are there tactical nuclear warheads in Cuba?" Smith stated that from the start of the crisis to the end they said, "We never saw anything." General Gribkov confirms that Washington was unaware of the presence of tactical nuclear weapons in Cuba, and further did not know that

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9 Amuchastegui, *op. cit.*., p. 101. A cautionary note here is that this article is the only published account by a former Cuban intelligence officer thus far.
General Pliyev had -- temporarily -- received nuclear release authority to use those very weapons in case of a US attack at a time when he was out of communication with Moscow.\textsuperscript{12}

President Kennedy and his advisors did not have an accurate picture of Soviet troop strength in Cuba. In late October US intelligence thought that the Soviet military there numbered around 10,000, when the correct figure was four times greater. This was just as US planners were mobilizing to launch a series of air strikes against Cuba and to follow them with a massive airborne and amphibious troop assault. By 19 November, the US intelligence estimate was some 12,000 to 16,000 Soviet military personnel overall. Retroactive estimates in early 1963 -- never later revised -- raised the total to 22,000 Soviet military personnel.\textsuperscript{13}

The third issue relates to the length of time needed to give strategic warning of the grave danger to the U.S. The President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) issued a major postmortem report over the signature of its chairman, James R. Killian, Jr. on 4 February 1963. It found that in the analysis of intelligence indicators and in the production of current intelligence reports, “the intelligence community failed to get across to key Government officials the most accurate possible picture of what the Soviets might be up to in Cuba” during the months preceding 14 October. The Killian report described this as a “near-total intelligence surprise” with respect to the introduction and deployment of Soviet strategic missiles in Cuba.\textsuperscript{14}

The report also discusses the shortcomings of the analytical and reporting process. The Community was taken to task for three things in particular: (a) inadequate early warning of hostile intentions and capabilities; (b) the failure to provide senior policy-makers with meaningful, cumulative assessments of the available intelligence indicators; and (c) the

\textsuperscript{13} Garthoff, op. cit., p. 35.
failure to produce a revision of the erroneous National Intelligence Estimate NIE 8-3-62, of 19 September.\textsuperscript{15}

Nowhere in this 10-page report, classified Top Secret, is there mention of adversarial denial and deception (D&D). Within US intelligence, the awareness and systematic study of foreign D&D had not been developed, and would not emerge until some 20 years later. It is likely that with a trained, well-staffed, and deception-aware analytical corps, the US could have uncovered Khrushchev’s great gamble long before Major Heyser’s fateful and revealing U-2 mission of 14 October.

The Soviet deception effort was comprehensive but not free from oversights and shortcomings. Those overly optimistic assessments by Marshal Biryuzov and Rashidov evidently went unchallenged. Some cover arrangements were slapdash and not thought out. Many of the failures of maskirovka occurred not in the USSR but in Cuba, when Soviet units confronted the realities of unloading their weapons and units, transporting them to the field, and getting established there. The operation might have been enhanced by the continued presence of maskirovka specialists with all Soviet units in Cuba. In the 1980s it was reported that a special maskirovka directorate had been created within the General Staff – an organization that would have played a central and vital role had it existed in 1962.\textsuperscript{16}

Four decades later, the Cuban Missile Crisis remains a topic of great interest to many, yet only now can we uncover much of its deception element. To paraphrase Sir Winston Churchill, perhaps the least-explored aspect of the crisis is the Soviet effort to cloak the truth of its strategic missile deployment within a bodyguard of lies, maskirovka means, and deception on a scale that most US planners could not begin to fathom nor comprehend.

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Great Falls, Virginia

\textsuperscript{15} CIA, ibid., pp. 367-368.
\textsuperscript{16} This revelation is linked to a former GRU officer who wrote under the pen name of “Viktor Suvorov,” and produced books and articles on the Soviet military and intelligence forces in the 1980s.
About the Author...

James (Jim) Hansen is a senior intelligence officer with DIA, specializing in counter-intelligence. He holds an M.A. in International Relations from the University of Michigan, and began his intelligence career with CIA in 1971. He is the author of two books, Correlation of Forces: Four Decades of Soviet Military Development (Praeger, 1987) and Japanese Intelligence: The Competitive Edge (NIBC, 1996). He has also prepared many articles for professional periodicals. Mr. Hansen is an authority on foreign intelligence services and is now approaching retirement.